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This paper estimates an identi￿ed VAR on US data to gauge the dynamic response of the job ￿nding
rate, the worker separation rate, and vacancies to monetary policy shocks. I develop a general equilibrium
model that can account for the large and persistent responses of vacancies, the job ￿nding rate, the smaller
but distinct response of the separation rate, and the inertial response of in￿ ation. The model incorporates
labor market frictions, capital accumulation, and nominal price rigidities. Special attention is paid to the
role of di⁄erent propagation mechanisms and the impact of search frictions on marginal costs. Estimates of
selected parameters of the model show that wage rigidity, moderate recruiting costs, and a high value of the
opportunity costs of employment are important in explaining the dynamic response of the economy. The
analysis extends to a broader set of aggregate shocks and can be used to understand and design monetary,
labor market, and other policies in the presence of labor market frictions.
1 Introduction
Empirical research shows that a key to understanding business cycle ￿ uctuations lies in labor market frictions
(Hall (1997), Gal￿, Gertler, and Lopez-Salido (2002), Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005)). Knowledge
of the exact nature of these frictions is necessary to design, for example, labor market and monetary policies
(Levin, Onatski, Williams, and Williams (2005)). Candidate labor market frictions are contractual frictions
and the time and resource costs associated with searching for suitable employment relationships. Although the
integration of search frictions held promise for the performance of business cycle models (Merz (1995), Andolfatto
(1996)), the ability of the canonical Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) model to account for the strong cyclicality
and persistence of vacancies, unemployment, and worker ￿ ows into and out of unemployment has recently been
questioned (Shimer (2005a), Pries (2004), Fujita (2004)).
I develop and estimate a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model that incorporates search
frictions and wage rigidity. The model is consistent with the magnitude and persistence of the responses of key
macroeconomic variables, including in￿ ation, vacancies, and the in￿ ows and out￿ ows of unemployment, to a
monetary policy shock. I use the model to assess the contribution of propagation mechanisms that are able to
reconcile the Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) (MP) model with the data. I analyze the role of search frictions
and wage rigidity in explaining the inertial response of in￿ ation.
￿I am grateful to Dale Mortensen, Larry Christiano, ￿va NagypÆl, Riccardo DiCecio, Reinout De Bock, Giorgio Primiceri,
Martin Eichenbaum, Peter Funk, Winfried Koeniger, Kripa Freitas, Ambarish Chandra, and Kaspar Hennig. I would also like to
thank seminar participants at Northwestern University and the St. Louis Fed and the research department of the St. Louis Fed for
its hospitality and support. Contact: h-braun@northwestern.edu
1I ￿nd that the mechanisms which are consistent with the amplitude and persistence of the responses of
vacancies, unemployment, the job ￿nding rate, the separation rate, and the inertial response of in￿ ation are (i)
wage rigidity, (ii) large ￿xed opportunity costs of employment relationships, (iii) moderate recruiting costs, and
(iv) adjustment costs in vacancy creation. The analysis is relevant not just for monetary policy shocks, because
unemployment, vacancies, and the job ￿nding and separation rate respond similarly to other aggregate shocks
(Fujita (2004), Fujita and Ramey (2005), Braun, De Bock, and DiCecio (2005)).
This paper contributes to the recent literature on the evaluation and reconciliation of the Mortensen and
Pissarides (1994) model of search frictions and unemployment with worker ￿ ows and vacancy data that the
model seeks to explain (see Mortensen and Nagypal (2005) for a summary). I develop new features and integrate
ones already proposed in this literature. I formulate wage rigidity in a tractable way that nests the standard
Nash-Bargaining solution used in the literature. I model vacancy adjustment costs that generate persistent,
hump-shaped responses of vacancies and the job ￿nding rate. Furthermore I analyze the role of overhead and
turnover costs. I include capital accumulation and model worker separations into unemployment.
The bulk of the literature has ignored the separation margin of employment adjustment and framed the
analysis in partial equilibrium. Even though the hiring margin is quantitatively more important, separations
are not acyclical and clearly react to monetary policy and other shocks. The separation decision is an economic
one and should be part of any attempt to model worker ￿ ows. I ￿nd that ignoring the behavior of worker
separations into unemployment is not only inconsistent with the data but may lead to erroneous conclusions
about the mechanisms at work. In addition, explicitly modelling capital costs as part of the surplus value of
￿rms and workers clears up some misconceptions about the role of ￿ capital overhead￿costs.
Another contribution of this paper lies in the extension of the analyses of search frictions in New-Keynesian
models.1 Closely related is the estimated DSGE model of Trigari (2004), who studies job ￿ ows data. Job ￿ ows
data point to a more volatile separation margin of employment adjustment.2 Adjustment on this margin can
be relatively cheap and an evaluation of the role of search frictions based on job ￿ ows may lead to di⁄erent
conclusions. Instead, I focus on the nature of the propagation mechanisms that can account for in￿ ation inertia
in conjunction with the observed responses of worker ￿ ows data and vacancies. Capital and investment are
included in the analysis because ￿in addition to recruiting costs, the costliness of separations, and the wage ￿
capital utilization costs are a key determinant of marginal costs and hence the response of in￿ ation.
To estimate parameters of the model and identify the dynamic response of the economy to a monetary policy
shock, I follow the limited information strategy in Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) (CEE). I identify
monetary policy shocks in a vector autoregression (VAR) representation of postwar US aggregate, worker ￿ ow,
and vacancy data. The identi￿cation strategy assumes that the nominal interest rate reacts contemporaneously
to monetary policy shocks while the variables ordered before the interest rate do not. The VAR includes output,
the price level, hours, wages, the nominal interest rate, investment, consumption, measures of job ￿nding and
worker separation rates constructed by Shimer (2005b), and a measure of vacancy posting.
The estimated responses of in￿ ation and other aggregate variables are consistent with those reported in
CEE and consistent with estimates using alternative speci￿cations and identifying assumptions (Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Evans (1999), Uhlig (2005)). The estimated responses of the job ￿nding rate, unemployment,
and vacancies are hump shaped, large, and persistent. The response of the worker separation rate is distinct but
less persistent, and contributes up to one third of changes in unemployment. These results are consistent with
1See Cooley and Quadrini (1999), Cheron and Langot (2000), Krause and Lubik (2003), Walsh (2005), Trigari (2004) and
Christo⁄el, Kuester, and Linzert (2005), who estimate Trigari (2004)￿ s model using a Bayesian approach on German data. For an
analysis in the absence of nominal price stickiness see Nason and Slotsve (2004).
2For a comparison of the cyclical properties of job and worker ￿ows data see Braun, De Bock, and DiCecio (2005). The ￿nding
that job destruction contributes more to employment changes is not necessarily at odds with the ￿ndings from worker ￿ow data, as
job destruction pertains to employment losses at contracting establishments and does not imply that the main margin of adjustment
is an increase in worker separations.
2the responses to embodied technology, neutral technology, demand, and monetary shocks identi￿ed using sign
restrictions in Braun, De Bock, and DiCecio (2005) and the responses to an aggregate shock estimated in Fujita
(2004) and Fujita and Ramey (2005). A key feature of worker ￿ ows is the strong cyclicality and persistence of
the job ￿nding rate of unemployed workers and vacancy posting activity by ￿rms. Stated di⁄erently, aggregate
shocks entail large and persistent movements along the Beveridge curve.
The dynamic general equilibrium model used to understand these responses incorporates a frictional labor
market based on Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) in a New-Keynesian model along the lines of CEE. Search
and matching frictions, endogenous worker separations, wage and price rigidities, variable capital utilization,
and investment and vacancy adjustment costs are key features of the model. Monetary policy follows a Taylor
rule.
I estimate the model parameters that govern the dynamic response of the economy using a limited information
minimum distance estimator. The parameters are chosen such that the model impulse responses match the
empirical impulse responses as closely as possible, where more weight is attributed to the responses which are
estimated more precisely. The estimated model impulse response functions are able to match their empirical
counterparts reasonably well.
The sectoral structure of the model is similar to Trigari (2004). A monopolistically competitive intermediate
good sector with nominal price rigidities in its output market uses homogenous goods produced by matched
￿rm-worker pairs (￿ jobs￿ ) as an input. In the job sector, ￿rms post vacancies in order to hire unemployed workers
in a frictional labor market. The job ￿nding probability of unemployed workers is increasing in the number of
vacancies relative to the size of the pool of unemployed and searching workers. Endogenous worker separations
into unemployment are due to idiosyncratic shocks to the match value.
Costly search and matching creates a quasi-rent for existing jobs that can be shared between ￿rm and worker
via a wage payment. This rent creates the scope for wage rigidity that is consistent with the participation
constraints of ￿rms and workers. Although the wage does not have allocational consequences for existing
matches, it determines the magnitude of the response of ￿rms￿pro￿ts to aggregate shocks and hence vacancy
posting and the creation of employment relationships. Hall (2005) and Shimer (2004) argue that the MP
model￿ s shortcomings in accounting for the large reaction of vacancies and the job ￿nding rate to reasonably
sized shocks can be attributed to the standard assumption of wage determination via Nash-Bargaining. Along
the lines suggested in Hall (2005), I model wage rigidity in a tractable way that nests the Nash-Bargaining
solution.
The estimated degree of wage rigidity contributes considerably to the model￿ s ability to match the empirical
responses of vacancies and the job ￿nding rate and is consistent with the weak response of wages. However, high
wage rigidity alone does not su¢ ce to explain the responses of the labor market variables, including separations.
The opportunity costs of employment must also be high. Wage rigidity alone may induce an eventual increase of
separations after an expansionary shock. The reason lies in the participation constraint of the worker. If wage
rigidity is high, ￿rms￿vacancy posting reacts strongly to shocks. This increases the value of workers￿outside
job-opportunities through an increase in the job ￿nding rate and may decrease the worker￿ s surplus value of
the match. The e⁄ect can be strong enough to reduce the joint continuation value of a ￿rm-worker match and
hence increase worker separations into unemployment, which is incompatible with the data. The value of the
participation constraint of the worker encompasses not only the value of outside job opportunities, but also of
the opportunity costs of employment ￿for example in the form of unemployment bene￿ts, the value of home
production, and the disutility of work net of the disutility of search. A high value of non-responsive opportunity
costs of employment implies that the response of the participation constraint of the worker is relatively small.
Then, the counterfactual e⁄ect on separations into unemployment described above is absent. Accordingly, the
estimate of the opportunity costs of employment is high relative to standard calibrations of the MP model.
3Furthermore, any unresponsive cost components of the match, such as ￿xed overhead, ￿ring, and training
costs in addition to the opportunity costs listed above increase the response of ￿rms￿surplus value of a ￿lled
job and hence of hiring activity to aggregate shocks. In the form of workers￿opportunity costs, this mechanism
is stressed by Hagedorn and Manovskii (2005) in a model without endogenous separations. In the form of ￿xed
capital costs, it is employed by Mortensen and Nagypal (2005) and Fujita and Ramey (2005). Training costs
appear in the hiring adjustment cost speci￿cation of Yashiv (2005).
Another shortcoming of the MP model is its inability to explain the persistence of vacancies and the job
￿nding rate. In response to a positive aggregate shock, the unemployment pool diminishes quickly as unemployed
workers ￿nd jobs. In the standard calibrations of the MP model, recruiting costs increase and vacancy creation
and hiring activity slump. I show that adjustment costs in the growth rate of vacancies generate persistent and
hump shaped responses of vacancies and the job ￿nding rate. This formulation can be interpreted as a reduced
form of a ￿ time-to-build￿model of vacancy creation as discussed below. Yashiv (2005) also assumes adjustment
costs in vacancy creation and hiring activity. Fujita and Ramey (2005) make vacancies a state variable by
assuming that vacancy creation is associated with sunk costs and show that ￿together with large ￿xed overhead
costs and recurrent job loss ￿the persistence of vacancies and the job ￿nding rate increases.
In Section 2, I discuss the construction of the separation and job ￿nding rates and present the estimated
impulse responses of the VAR to a monetary policy shock. Section 3 lays out the model. In Section 4, I present
the estimates of parameters of the model that govern the dynamic responses of the variables of interest. Section
5 discusses the results and the mechanisms at work. I change parameter values from the point estimates to
understand the contribution of the propagation channels and conduct a sensitivity analysis with respect to
the values of calibrated parameters. Section 6 analyzes the role of overhead and training costs as sources of
ampli￿cation. Section 7 extends and estimates a variant of the model that incorporates an intensive margin of
hours adjustment. Section 8 concludes and suggests avenues for further research.
2 Structural VAR Analysis
2.1 Data
The quarterly data of the VAR analysis includes real GDP (Y ), the GDP de￿ ator (P), real wages (per capita,
w) , hours (H), consumption (C), investment (I), the Fed Funds rate (R), a measure of vacancies (v), and job
￿nding (hir) and separation probabilities (sep). In Section 7 I consider an alternative VAR speci￿cation by
replacing hours with employment and average hours (per worker) to analyze the extensive and intensive margin
of labor adjustment. Because the response of average hours is small, the response of total hours and employment
are similar.
The separation and the job ￿nding rate are obtained from Shimer (2005b).3 The separation rate is con-
structed from CPS data on the short term unemployment rate. Using this separation rate, the job ￿nding rate is
constructed from di⁄erences in the unemployment pool across months. Both are adjusted for time-aggregation
bias. Since they refer to exit rates from employment to unemployment and out of unemployment, ￿ ows between
non-participation and the labor force are ignored.
In particular, assume that there are only worker ￿ ows between unemployment (U) and employment (E).
Assume that the separation and job ￿nding rates are constant within a time period t;t+1. Denote these Poisson
arrival rates by f sept and f hirt respectively. Consider the evolution of the unemployment pool at a date ￿ 2 (0;1)
3For additional details, please see Shimer (2005b) and his webpage http://home.uchicago.edu/~shimer/data/￿ows/. For the
approach, see also Darby, Haltiwanger, and Plant (1985).
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Xt+￿ denotes the time derivative.
The CPS contains data on the short-term unemployment of less than 5 weeks, Us. Within a period, the




t+￿ = f sepEt+￿ ￿ f hirtUs
t+￿; (2)
where Us
t+￿ measures the pool of workers who have become unemployed since the beginning of period t.
Combining (1) and (2), and solving the resulting di⁄erential equation using Us
t = 0 yields
Ut+1 = Ute￿g hirt + Us
t+1 (3)
Given data on Ut; Ut+1, and Us
t+1, (3) can be used to construct the job-￿nding rate f hirt. The separation
rate then follows from
Ut+1 = (1 ￿ e￿g hirt￿g sept)
f sept
f hirt + f sept
Lt + e￿g hirt￿g septUt; (4)
where Lt ￿ Ut +Et is the labor force. Given the job ￿nding rate f hirt, and labor force data Lt and Ut, equation









Ut+1 respectively. The construction of f sept and f hirt takes into account that
workers may experience multiple transitions between dates t and t+1. The corresponding probabilities used in
the VAR are sept = 1 ￿ e￿g sept and hirt = 1 ￿ e￿g hirt. These correspond to the separation and job ￿nding rates
in the discrete-time model formulated in Section 3.
Using a sample overlapping with BLS data constructed by Bleakley, Ferris, and Fuhrer (1999) that includes
￿ ows for the non-participation state, Shimer (2005b) shows that movements in the separation and job ￿nding
rates account for the bulk of unemployment and ￿to a lesser extent ￿employment changes. For a further
discussion of the construction, business cycle properties, sensitivity to adjustments necessitated by the 1994
CPS redesign, and a comparison to job ￿ ows data see Braun, De Bock, and DiCecio (2005).
Figures 1 and 2 from Braun, De Bock, and DiCecio (2005) show the cyclical and trend behavior of the series,
￿ltered using an HP ￿lter with smoothing parameter 1600. Shaded areas denote NBER recession dates. Both
job ￿nding and separation probabilities show a strong cyclicality. Spikes in the separation rate are distinct
during recessions, although their magnitude has decreased in the past two recessions.
For the VAR, I use quarterly averages of the monthly data. Vacancies are measured using the Conference
Board Help Wanted Index, scaled by the labor force.4 Figure 3 shows the business cycle and trend behavior of
the vacancy series.
The sample used in the VAR covers the period 1954:Q3-2003:Q4. All variables in the VAR except for the
Fed Funds rate have been logged. Details of the remaining data sources can be found in appendix A.
2.2 VAR Representation
Consider the following reduced form VAR:
Yt = ￿ +
Pp
j=1 AjYt￿j + ut; Eutu0
t = V; (5)



















B. Business Cycle Component Job Finding Probability

















B. Business Cycle Component Separation Probability


















B. Business Cycle Component Vacancies
Figure 3: Vacancies
where p is the number of lags.







I estimate the reduced form VAR (5) including p = 3 lags using OLS.5 The reduced form residuals, ut, are
related to the structural shocks, ￿t, by ￿t = A0ut or equivalently by ut = C￿t, where C = A
￿1
0 . The structural
shocks are orthogonal to each other, i.e., E￿t￿0
t = I. The last element of " is the monetary policy shock; The
remaining elements of ￿t are not identi￿ed. Monetary policy shocks are identi￿ed as in CEE by assuming that
the 10th column of A0 has the following structure:
A0 (:;10) = [01￿9;a0]
0 :
The identifying assumption can be interpreted as the monetary authority following a Taylor rule like policy,
which responds to all the variables ordered before the interest rate in the VAR.
The solid lines in Figure 4 display the impulse response functions (IRFs) of output, in￿ ation, the Fed funds
rate, hours, the real wage, the job ￿nding rate, the separation rate, vacancies, consumption, and investment to a
one standard deviation monetary policy shock. Except for the responses of the nominal interest rate and in￿ a-
tion which are represented in annualized percentage point deviations, all variables are expressed in percentage
deviations. The shaded areas are bootstrapped 95% con￿dence intervals around the point estimates. The al-
ternative speci￿cation of the VAR within this identi￿cation framework that imposes cointegration relationships
between variables (Altig, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and LindØ (2005)) did not alter the estimates of the impulse
response functions considerably.
5The lag length was selected with the Akaike Information Criterion.
74 quarters 8 quarters 20 quarters
Y output 9(3;18) 10(4;23) 6(3;18)
￿ in￿ ation 3(1;11) 3(1;10) 4(2;11)
R Fed Funds Rate 20(11;25) 13(8;19) 12(7;18)
H hours 8(3;18) 15(6;30) 12(5;25)
w wage 1(:05;2) 1(0:3;2) 1(:09;2)
hir job ￿nding 5(1;11) 11(4;22) 9(4;19)
sep separations 7(3;16) 9(4;16) 6(3;13)
v vacancies 10(4;20) 14(6;27) 11(5;22)
C consumption 1(:2;2) 2(:3;5) 2(:5;8)
I investment 11(5;21) 12(5;24) 10(5;20)
Table 1: Percentage of Variance of the Forecast Error due to Monetary Policy Shocks (95 percent bootstrapped
con￿dence interval boundaries in parentheses)
The last panel shows the response of unemployment and the contributions of the separation and job ￿nding
probabilities to unemployment. Unemployment is approximated using the steady state relationship ut+1 =
g sept
g sept+g hirt
. The approximation is very accurate for the aggregate data (Shimer (2005b)). The contributions





respectively, where hir and sep are sample
means.
In response to an expansionary monetary policy shock, the fall in the interest rate leads to a persistent, hump
shaped increase in output, reaching a peak after about 5 quarters. In￿ ation initially falls before increasing
slightly (the ￿ price puzzle￿ ). The Fed Funds Rate returns to its steady state level after about 10 quarters.
Similarly to output, hours respond in a hump-shaped manner, but show slightly more persistence. There is
no clear response of the real wage. The job ￿nding rate and vacancies exhibit strong hump shaped responses,
while the separation rate￿ s response is U-shaped and less persistent. Notice that the largest e⁄ect is reached
earlier for the separation rate than for the job ￿nding rate. In the early phase following the shock, separations
contribute about one third to the change in unemployment. This is in line with the ￿ndings in Braun, De Bock,
and DiCecio (2005) who identify a broader set of shocks using sign restrictions. The shape and magnitude of
the responses of output, in￿ ation, the Fed Funds rate, hours, consumption, and investment are consistent with
those estimated in CEE.
Table 1 presents the percentage variance of the k-step ahead forecast errors due to monetary policy shocks.
As discussed in CEE, these estimates are imprecise, sensitive to the VAR speci￿cation and should hence be
interpreted with caution. Nevertheless, monetary policy shocks contribute a non-trivial fraction to the variance
of the variables of interest.
The volatility of the job ￿nding rate has increased relative to the separation rate (Shimer (2005b)). This
may be connected to the past two ￿ jobless￿recoveries. (Schreft and Singh (2003), Groshen and Potter (2003)).
Furthermore, monetary policy or its transmission may have changed in the post Volcker period (Boivin and
Giannoni (2002)). Overall, volatility of aggregate real variables has decreased since the early 1980￿ s (Kim and
Nelson (1999), Stock and Watson (2002)). I estimated a VAR on the post 1980:I sample: The magnitude of the
monetary policy shock and the persistence of its e⁄ects are somewhat smaller and the price puzzle is absent.







































































Figure 4: IRFs to a Monetary policy shock (in % deviations, annualized for in￿ ation and the Fed Funds Rate).
Dashed lines are model IRFs (see below). The last panel shows contributions of changes in the job ￿nding and
the separation rate to unemployment changes.
3 The Model
This Section develops the general equilibrium model.
Consumption and investment goods are produced in a competitive ￿nal good sector using di⁄erentiated
intermediate goods supplied by a monopolistically competitive sector (￿ Intermediate Goods Sector￿ ). The latter
in turn uses goods produced by ￿ jobs￿as an input. Jobs combine capital services and labor to produce a
homogenous good, sold in a competitive market. In the ￿ job￿sector, workers and ￿rms meet in a frictional labor
market. Households supply labor, accumulate capital and rent capital services to jobs. Pro￿ts of ￿rms are
rebated to households. Unemployment risk is diversi￿ed among ￿ families￿(Andolfatto (1996) and Merz (1995)).
Figure 5 summarizes the sectoral structure of the economy. Instead of modelling search frictions and nom-
inal price rigidities in separate sectors, one could assume that there are quadratic price adjustment costs in
conjunction with search frictions in the monopolistically competitive sector (see e.g. Krause and Lubik (2003)).
The results would be equivalent. I use the sectoral structure to make the comparison to the existing literature
immediate.
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Figure 5: Sectoral Structure of the Model Economy
After developing the job sector, I describe the intermediate good sector, the ￿nal good sector, households,
and the policy of the monetary authority.
3.1 Jobs and the Labor Market
A job is a ￿ ￿rm-worker￿pair.6 Job output is produced according to
Atk￿;
where k denotes capital services rented from households at rental rate rk
t , ￿ is the elasticity of match output
with respect to capital, and At measures aggregate productivity, identical across jobs. The goods produced by
jobs are sold to intermediate good ￿rms in a competitive market at relative price pjt:
For existing jobs, the timing is as follows. At the beginning of the period, the ￿rm decides how much
capital to rent for that period. Subsequently, the worker draws an iid idiosyncratic utility cost of working,
a ￿ F (￿):7 The realization of this preference shock is observable to the ￿rm. If the realization is less than a
certain endogenous threshold at, match continuation is jointly optimal for the ￿rm-worker pair. Then, wages
are determined via a variant of Nash-Bargaining and production takes place.
If the value of the preference shock exceeds the threshold, match continuation would be too costly due to
the participation constraints of ￿rm and worker, the worker separates and enters the pool of unemployed and
searching workers. The probability of endogenous worker separation is hence 1 ￿ F (at): The ￿rm chooses the
6The model abstracts from job-to-job transitions of workers. Hence, job and worker ￿ows are tied.
7Here I deviate from the multiplicative productivity shock speci￿cation of most of the literature on endogenous job destruction.
In this literature, a lognormal distribution of idiosyncratic match productivity shocks is assumed. This assumption implicitly pins
down both the elasticity of the separation rate with respect to changes of the threshold at which determines the response of the
separation rate to shocks and the relation of ￿xed match components (such as unemployment bene￿ts) to average productivity.
Thus, the costliness of separations is tied to propagation on the hiring margin due to ￿xed cost-components of the match. A global
distributional assumption is (i) not necessary for the local analysis undertaken here and (ii) makes comparisons to the literature on
exogenous destruction di¢ cult. The preference shock speci￿cation has also been used by Cooley and Quadrini (1999) and Trigari
(2004) and is similar to an overhead cost shock sepci￿cation on the ￿rm side.
10threshold value at at the beginning of the period. As I show below, one can equally think of a joint decision
of the ￿rm and worker pair because the ￿rm wants to discontinue the match if and only if the worker ￿nds
separation optimal. Furthermore, the assumption that the capital intensity and separation threshold decisions
are made before the realization of the idiosyncratic preference shock serves purely to simplify the exposition.
The match survives into the next period with probability (1 ￿ ￿x), where ￿x is the exogenous separation
probability.
Unmatched ￿rms (￿ vacancies￿ ) and unemployed workers meet in a frictional labor market described by a
matching function. Firms decide wether or not to post vacancies at the beginning of the period. If a ￿rm meets
a suitable worker, production can take place in the following period. Vacancy creation is subject to free entry.
The vacancy ￿lling probability qt and the job ￿nding probability hirt depend on the measure of vacancies
posted vt and the size of the pool of searching (unemployed) workers ut: In particular, the number of matches




t , where m is a
matching e¢ ciency parameter and ￿ 2 (0;1):






















Note that the vacancy ￿lling probability is decreasing and the job ￿nding probability is increasing in market
tightness vt
ut, re￿ ecting congestion externalities on either side of the labor market.






where ￿t = 1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿x)F (at) is the separation rate. Since worker separation takes place at the beginning of
the period before production takes place and new matches are formed, the period t pool of unemployed workers
is ut = 1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿t)nt.
We now turn to the three central economic decisions governing: (i) vacancy posting, (ii) separations, and
(iii) wage determination. To spare notation, I will specify the information available when the decisions are made
after laying out the model. The information set is consistent with the identifying assumptions of the VAR.
3.1.1 Value Functions
Denote the beginning-of-period t ￿rm value of being matched to a worker with Jt and the worker￿ s value of being
matched to a ￿rm with Wt: All values are measured in consumption units. The relevant stochastic discount
factor for workers and ￿rms (which are owned by households) is ￿t+1 = ￿
￿t+1
￿t ; where ￿t is the marginal utility
of consumption in period t and ￿ < 1:
The revenue product of a match net of capital costs is
￿t = pjtAtk￿ ￿ rk
t k:





￿t ￿ wt + (1 ￿ ￿x)Et￿t+1Jt+1 + ￿xEt￿t+1Vt+1;Vt
￿
dF (a); (6)
11where wt is the wage bill. The ￿rm value J is either equal to current pro￿ts ￿t￿wt plus the expected continuation
value weighed by the relevant discount factor, or equal to the value of a vacancy V if the latter exceeds the
former. The wage bill may in turn depend on the realization of the preference shock. Equation (6) takes into
account that for some (high) realizations of the preference shock, a separation of the match is optimal and
the ￿rm is left with a vacancy. Note also that capital costs are only incurred if the match ￿nds it optimal to
produce.
A vacant ￿rm incurs vacancy posting costs of ￿vac
t per period and is matched to a suitable worker with
probability qt. A new match survives into the following period with probability (1 ￿ ￿x), when production takes
place.
The value of a vacancy satis￿es
Vt = ￿￿vac
t + qt (1 ￿ ￿x)Et￿t+1Jt+1 + (1 ￿ qt (1 ￿ ￿x))Et￿t+1Vt+1. (7)
Vacancy posting costs ￿vac
t will enter the resource constraint of the economy.








+ (1 ￿ ￿x)Et￿t+1Wt+1 + ￿x￿t+1Ut+1;Ut
￿
dF (a); (8)
where Ut is the value of being unemployed.
When unemployed, the worker receives income b, measured in consumption units. The value b encompasses
unemployment bene￿ts and home production and is assumed to be ￿xed (￿ non-responsive￿ ).8
With probability hirt, the unemployed worker is matched to a vacancy at the end of the period and the
match survives into the following period with probability (1 ￿ ￿x). The unemployment value Ut satis￿es:
Ut = b + hirt (1 ￿ ￿x)Et￿t+1Wt+1 + (1 ￿ hirt (1 ￿ ￿x))Et￿t+1Ut+1. (9)








￿ b ￿ hirt (1 ￿ ￿x)Et￿t+1￿t+1 + (1 ￿ ￿x)Et￿t+1￿t+1;0
￿
dF (a). (10)
Note that the value of continuing at the current job in the next period is equal to the the value of ￿nding a job
at another ￿rm for the next period, because preference shocks are iid across matches and time and there is no
heterogeneity across matches or ￿rms.
The iid assumption is made in the business cycle literature with few exceptions (e.g. Hussey (2005)) and
greatly simpli￿es the analysis because knowledge of a distribution of ￿ job-￿or ￿ worker￿ - types is not necessary. I
discuss the drawbacks of this assumptions in the conclusion.
3.1.2 Vacancy Creation





= (1 ￿ ￿x)Et￿t+1Jt+1. (11)
Recall that the vacancy ￿lling probability qt is decreasing in labor market tightness, i.e., decreasing in the ratio
of vacancies to unemployed workers. An increase in labor market tightness makes it harder for ￿rms to ￿nd
8This assumption would need to be modi￿ed if persistent shocks were considered. For example, unemployment bene￿ts would
depend on previous or aggregate wages.
12workers and increases e⁄ective recruiting costs on the left hand side of (11). For standard calibrations of the
MP-model, ￿ uctuations of the ￿rm value J are not large enough in response to reasonably sized shocks to
account for the observed volatility of labor market tightness (the Beveridge curve).
Most ampli￿cation mechanisms model discussed in the literature and in developed in this paper serve to
directly increase the variability of J in the vacancy creation condition (11). One exception is De Bock (2005)
who shows that capital embodied technology shocks increases the persistence of vacancies and improves the
MP models ability to match the business cycle facts. Another are ampli￿cation and persistence mechanisms
introduced through recurrent job loss (Pries (2004)) and job ladders (Krause and Lubik (2004b)) which mitigate
the decrease in qt through a delayed decrease in the number of searching workers.
Also, most of the recent literature on the evaluation of the Mortensen Pissarides Model does not directly
deal with the persistence of the response of vacancies and the job ￿nding rate to aggregate shocks.








with ￿v ￿ 0 and { > 0.
Suppose a small ￿ advertising￿sector of the economy specializes in the provision of recruiting services. Suppose
that ￿due to specialization ￿it takes time for this sector to expand its services. We would expect the marginal
costs and hence the service price to be decreasing in the resources available in that sector at a given point in
time. One can think of vt￿1 as a proxy for these resources. Hence, when vt￿1 is large, the costs associated with
a given level of vt are small.
Vacancy posting costs are increasing in the growth rate of vacancies. A similar assumption will be made
for investment adjustment costs, as in CEE. For investment, Lucca (2005) shows that random maturity time-
to-build or time-to-plan in conjunction with imperfect substitutability between investment projects leads to
a speci￿cation as in (12). In work in progress, Braun, De Bock, and Lucca (2005) tie vacancy creation and
investment to explain the persistent and hump-shaped responses of vacancies and investment observed in the
data.
Note that the e⁄ect of vacancy posting on future vacancy posting costs is external to the vacancy creation
decision (11). The same is true for the e⁄ect that current vacancy posting has on qt (the congestion externality).
One can formulate a model where ￿rms of non-degenerate size internalize the e⁄ect of vacancy posting on ￿vac
t .
This does not alter the results qualitatively, although the estimated value of ￿v would change.
3.1.3 Endogenous Worker Separations
When the realized preference shock of existing matches is too high, continuation of the match is not pro￿table
and worker and ￿rm ￿nd it optimal to separate.
Consider the joint surplus value of a match, i.e., the sum of the ￿rm and worker values of being matched,
Jt + Wt, net of the outside option of the ￿rm and worker, Vt + Ut. Vt and Ut constitute the participation
constraints of the match. Because Vt = 0, the surplus value of a match is St = Jt + ￿t or ￿ using (6) and (10):








￿ b ￿ (1 ￿ ￿x)hirtEt￿t+1￿t+1 + (1 ￿ ￿x)Et￿t+1St+1;0
￿
dF (a): (13)




￿ b ￿ (1 ￿ ￿x)hirtEt￿t+1￿t+1 + (1 ￿ ￿x)Et￿t+1St+1 = 0: (14)
This is the jointly privately e¢ cient separation threshold. Match continuation is optimal i⁄ a ￿ at. Note that
the wage payment is absent from (13). The separation threshold is independent of wage transfers between ￿rm
and worker: It is jointly e¢ cient. The variants of wage determination considered below all satisfy this property.
Hence, the values can be expressed as
Jt = maxk;a
Z at







￿ b + (1 ￿ ￿x)(1 ￿ hirt)Et￿t+1￿t+1dF (a),
and the jointly e¢ cient separation requirement may be stated as
argmaxaJ = argmaxa￿ = argmaxaS.
3.1.4 Real Marginal Costs and Propagation
Recall that job output is sold to the intermediate good sector in a competitive market at relative price pjt.
For the monopolistically competitive ￿rms in the intermediate sector, pjt represents real marginal cost. The
response of real marginal costs is in turn the key determinant of in￿ ation and output responses to the monetary
policy shock.
Condition (11) sheds light on how real marginal costs are related to the wage, the rental rate of capital


























F(at) is the average wage. Note that pjt+1 is related to current and future (expected)
recruiting costs ￿
vac
q . In particular, if current recruiting costs increase, pjt+1 increases ceteris paribus. The
extent to which pjt+1 must increase in percentage terms in turn depends on the response and level of wt+1:
Hence there is a relationship between real marginal costs, wages, and vacancy creation, through its positive
e⁄ect of the latter on recruiting costs. Of course this relationship is confounded by reactions of the interest rate,
the discount factor, the separation rate, expected future recruiting costs, and wage determination (see below).
The model solution will be approximated by linearizing the equilibrium conditions around the non-stochastic
steady state. To gain intuition for the propagation mechanisms and determinants of the dynamics of marginal
costs, it is useful to consider the linearized version of (15). Assume that aggregate technology A is ￿xed. As
shown below, capital choice is jointly e¢ cient ￿ also under the deviation from Nash-Bargaining considered in
this paper. Hence ￿t+1 = pjt+1Ak￿
t+1 ￿ rk

























t+1 ￿ b qt+1
￿
￿ Et"F;ab at+1 + Etb ￿t+1
￿
(16)
+ (1 ￿ ￿)
w
￿
Etb wt+1 + ￿Etb rk
t+1,
where the time index is dropped to signify steady state values, b xt+1 =
xt+1￿x
x , and "F;a =
f(a)a
F(a) is the steady
14state elasticity of the preference shock distribution with respect to the separation threshold a:
First, note that for w
￿ = 1, the marginal cost equation (16) collapses to one that holds in an economy without
search frictions. In that case, the dynamics of marginal costs are governed by movements in the wage and the
rental rate of capital, as determined by the capital share ￿. In the presence of search frictions, terms involving
current and future recruiting costs, the separation rate, and the discount factor also determine the reaction of
marginal costs.
Second, a value of w





on real marginal costs. Stated di⁄erently, a given change in pj has a large e⁄ect on recruiting costs. The same
would be true for a shock to aggregate productivity A. E⁄ective recruiting costs are in turn an increasing
function of vacancies for two reasons: An increase in vacancies decreases the vacancy ￿lling probability q (the






. Hence, vacancies react strongly to shocks in pj if
w
￿ is close to one. A strong reaction of vacancies in turn implies a large e⁄ect on the job ￿nding rate. This
propagation channel is stressed by Hagedorn and Manovskii (2005) in a model without endogenous separations.
The expression 1 ￿ w
￿ represents ￿ ow pro￿ts of the ￿rm relative to the net revenue product of the match. In
equilibrium, pro￿ts compensate the ￿rm for recruiting costs due to the free entry condition. A small value of
1 ￿ w
￿ hence implies that recruiting costs are small.
As discussed in Section 6, capital outlays in the form of ￿xed overhead costs as in Fujita and Ramey (2005)
induce additional ampli￿cation. Fixed capital costs are, however, grossly inconsistent with the behavior of the
capital share in income over the business cycle. A general equilibrium model must take into account that capital
outlays are an endogenous variable.
Third, notice that a high elasticity of the preference shock distribution with respect to the threshold a
reduces the response of real marginal costs for a given change in a: The elasticity governs the costliness of
separations. If "F;a is large, separations can be reduced for a small increase in the threshold a in response
to an expansionary shock. Because every increase in a requires compensation of the worker, a large elasticity
"F;a makes adjustments on the separation margin inexpensive for the match. Finally, note that the presence of
search frictions does not eliminate the in￿ uence of wages on marginal costs.
Of course, movements in the threshold b at+1 and the average wage b wt+1 in turn depend on the endogenous
variables: To pin down these relationships we now turn to the determination of wages.
3.1.5 Wage Determination
Wages are transfers from the ￿rm to the worker. If there is no intensive margin of hours adjustment, wages
do not have allocational implications for the current ￿rm-worker relationship as long as they do not induce
ine¢ cient separations between ￿rm and worker. As explained above, I require that wage determination induces
separations that are jointly privately e¢ cient. In other words, separations do not occur merely because the
wage is not renegotiated when it would be e¢ cient to do so.
Wage determination outside of the match does have an impact through the outside option and participation
constraint of the worker (U) and the free entry condition of ￿rms (V = 0). Recall that the job ￿nding rate
(hir), the worker surplus value of outside job opportunities (￿), and the joint continuation value (S) enter the
separation condition (14). How wages are determined in other available jobs in￿ uences the separation decision,
through ￿rms￿vacancy creation decision, the implied job ￿nding probability, and the worker value of outside
job opportunities.
Assume that wage payments are made after choice of k has been made and after the preference shock a ￿ at.
has been realized. Denote the ￿rm, worker, and joint surplus values at a particular value of a ￿ at and a given
wage schedule wt (a) by ￿t (a;w(a)), Jt (a;wt (a)), and St (a;wt (a)) respectively.
15We proceed by presenting the Nash-Bargaining approach to wage determination, which is standard in the
literature.9
Nash Bargaining Nash-Bargaining with worker share ￿ 2 (0;1) and ￿rm share 1 ￿ ￿ implies
8a ￿ at : (1 ￿ ￿)￿t (wt (a);a) = ￿Jt (w(a);a): (17)
Using the value expressions (6) and (10) and solving for the wage yields
wnash




+ b + (1 ￿ ￿x)hirtEt￿t+1￿t+1
￿
+ ￿￿t (18)
+￿ (1 ￿ ￿x)Et￿t+1Jt+1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿x)Et￿t+1￿t+1:
Because wages in period t+1 are also determined via Nash-Bargaining, the di⁄erence between the last terms in
(18) is zero. Also hirt (1 ￿ ￿x)Et￿t￿t+1 = hirt
￿





















The worker is compensated for utility costs, the value of non-market activities, the rents she could appropriate
through outside job o⁄ers, and obtains a share of the match revenue product ￿t:











Clearly, Nash-Bargaining satis￿es the requirement that separations are jointly e¢ cient, because the surplus S
is shared:
Linearizing (19) around the non-stochastic steady state and using the expression for marginal costs (the
linearized vacancy creation condition (16)) and (20) yields









t+1 ￿ b qt+1
￿























. Note that b at+1 does no enter (21).
The level of wages relative to revenue ￿ which determines the magnitude of the response of marginal costs
in (16) is replaced by the level of ￿ cost components￿of the match, e b =
H(a)
￿ + b, in relation to the revenue ￿.
Training and overhead costs considered in Section 6 enter in a similar fashion.
The bargaining share ￿ enters (16) directly only in conjunction with the outside option value of the worker.
A higher ￿ increases the e⁄ect of the job ￿nding rate, reduces the magnitudes of e⁄ects of current and future
e⁄ective hiring costs, b ￿
vac
t ￿b qt, and the magnitude of the e⁄ect of the marginal utility of consumption. However,
the bargaining share determines
H(a)
￿ +b
￿ . A higher worker share ￿ increases this ratio.
9Exceptions are Delacroix (2004) and Hall and Milgrom (2005). Also see the discussion in Mortensen and Nagypal (2005).
16Real Wage Rigidity The Nash-Bargaining assumption pins down the transfer from ￿rm to worker in one
particular way. An alternative is proposed by Hall (2005). Suppose there exists a social norm wage payment ws
and assume that ￿whenever possible ￿workers receive the norm wage. Deviations from ws only take place if
the joint surplus value S is non-negative and ws violates the participation constraints of ￿rms or workers (and
would hence lead to ine¢ cient separations). Either aggregate or idiosyncratic shocks could necessitate such
deviations.10
Similarly to Hall (2005), I re￿ne this form of wage rigidity by introducing a notion of the degree of real wage
rigidity. Assume that wages are equal to the normed wage ws unless the worker￿ s surplus share induced by this
wage becomes either too high or too low. In that case, the surplus is divided with the respective ￿ boundary￿
shares ￿max and ￿min. The degree of wage rigidity is governed by the extent to which these boundary shares
di⁄er from each other and could be loosely interpreted as a reduced form stemming from costs associated with
the bargaining process.
Suppose a realization e a is associated with a wage payment e w. Denote the worker value induced by this wage
and shock realization with ￿t (e w;e a) and the joint surplus value of the match with St (e a): St (e a) does not depend
on wages, because the wage schedule satis￿es the jointly e¢ cient separation condition. Intuitively, the wage
adjusts in regions close to the participation constraints.
The share of the worker surplus in the total surplus is
￿t(e w;e a)
St(e a) : Under Nash bargaining,
￿t(e w;e a)
St(e a) is equal to
the ￿xed fraction ￿ ￿the worker￿ s bargaining share ￿for all realizations of e a ￿ at. In other words, the wage
adjusts to changes in e a or aggregate conditions and
￿t(e w;e a)
St(e a) remains constant. Let ￿min and ￿max denote the
minimum and maximum worker shares that do not lead to a renegotiation of the wage. Implicitly, these de￿ne




, the normed wage induces a worker share between ￿min and ￿max; where the former are
















+ b ￿ (1 ￿ ￿x)(1 ￿ hirt)Et￿t+1￿t+1
￿
+ ￿min (￿t + (1 ￿ ￿x)Et￿tJt+1) (22)
and
ws




+ b ￿ (1 ￿ ￿x)(1 ￿ hirt)Et￿t+1￿t+1
￿
+ ￿max (￿t + (1 ￿ ￿x)Et￿tJt+1); (23)
Now consider a realization of the shock that is smaller than amin. If the worker were paid ws
t, her share would
be less than ￿min. Assume that in such a case, the wage is reset to a value that guarantees the share ￿min. For






+ b ￿ (1 ￿ ￿x)(1 ￿ hirt)Et￿t+1￿t+1
￿
+ ￿min (￿t + (1 ￿ ￿x)Et￿tJt+1): (24)
Expression (24) is equivalent to wage determination via Nash-Bargaining with worker share ￿min. An analogous
expression holds for wage payments for realizations of the preference shock above the threshold amax and below
the destruction threshold a .11
10This is one di⁄erence to the Calvo-Pricing that will be assumed in the intermediate goods market. Furthermore, participation
constraints are not violated ex-post. Note that endogenous wage adjustments take place in the non-stochastic steady state due to
idiosyncratic shocks.
11Note that the wage schedule is discontinuous at the cuto⁄s amax and amin:
17De￿ne wt =
R a wt (a)
dF(a)











+ b ￿ (1 ￿ ￿x)(1 ￿ hirt)Et￿t+1￿t+1
￿












+ b ￿ (1 ￿ ￿x)(1 ￿ hirt)Et￿t+1￿t+1
￿











F(at) is the fraction of matches that does not experience a wage adjustment in period t:
We can verify that the wage schedule given by (25) satis￿es the condition of jointly privately e¢ cient
separations by substituting (25) into the ￿rm value (6): Di⁄erentiating with respect to the threshold yields the
separation condition (14).
How should wage rigidity be parameterized? Given a distribution of idiosyncratic preference shocks and
given shares ￿max and ￿min, de￿nitions (22) and (23) would pin down steady state values of the adjustment
thresholds amax and amin. Condition (25) would then pin down a value of the norm wage ws consistent with the
distributional assumption and a given level of the average wage. I follow a di⁄erent route here which is feasible
because the model solution is approximated by a ￿rst order linear approximation. It allows a parsimonious
parameterization of wage rigidity with a single parameter. More importantly, changes in the degree of wage
rigidity do not a⁄ect the level of wages. As discussed above, the level of wages is a propagation mechanism
itself and needs to be isolated from the rigidity of wages. Instead of specifying a distribution and the boundary
shares, I parameterize wage rigidity by the fraction of wages adjusted in steady state, ￿
w, and assume that
1. the steady state social norm wage is equal to the steady state average wage,
w = ws (26)
2. the mass of steady state adjustments and the boundary shares are symmetric with respect to the truncated

















where ￿ is the worker share that determines the steady state division of ￿ and J.
In Appendix B, I show that ￿given restrictions (26), (27) and (28) ￿the linearized version of the average
wage equation (25) around the steady state is:


















F(a) , w = b￿(1 ￿ ￿x)(1 ￿ hir)￿￿, and b w
nash
t is derived from the linearized version of (18).12 The
dynamics of the real wage are governed by the weighted average of the normed wage and the Nash bargained
12The term ￿ (1 ￿ ￿x)Et￿t+1Jt+1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿x)Et￿t+1￿t+1 in (18) is not zero here because future values are not shared
via Nash bargaining. Expression (29) di⁄ers from the one postulated in Krause and Lubik (2003) because it (i) takes into account
that future wages are not Nash bargaining wages and (ii) satis￿es the requirement of jointly e¢ cient separations.
18wage. The term involving b at ￿ corrects￿the weighted average for wage adjustments necessitated by the jointly
e¢ cient separations requirement. Note also that expression (29) allows for dynamics of the social norm wage.
For example, nominal wage rigidity could be introduced through the dynamics of ws. Dynamics of the social
norm ws are an interesting extension for the response of the economy to persistent shocks. Here, assume for
simplicity that ws remains ￿xed.
Wage dynamics following (29) with small or no responses of ws to shocks induce procyclical ￿ uctuations of
the ￿rm share in the joint surplus. A positive aggregate shock leads to an increase in J exceeding the increase




qt , vacancies and hence the
job ￿nding probability of unemployed workers react more strongly to shocks. As the wage is non-allocational
for continuing matches, wage rigidity is relevant only insofar as it impacts the division of the joint surplus for
newly formed matches.13
3.1.6 Capital Services
A job￿ s demand for capital services follows from (6) using the expression for wage payments (25). Capital




















t = 0. (30)
3.1.7 Limited Information Decisions
In order to simplify the notation above, the information available to the agents when the decisions are made
was not speci￿ed. In agreement with the identi￿cation strategy used in the VAR, assume that the choice of
vacancies vt (associated with the vacancy creation condition (11)), the wage schedule, and the separation cuto⁄
at (associated with the separation condition (14)) do not respond contemporaneously to monetary policy shocks.
3.1.8 Aggregate Job-Output, Hours, and Demand for Capital Services






Nt = (1 ￿ ￿t)nt
measures aggregate hours worked and
Kt = (1 ￿ ￿t)ntkt
is the aggregate demand for capital services.
3.2 Final and Intermediate Goods Sectors
The presentation of the ￿nal and intermediate goods sectors and households follows CEE. Details of the deriva-
tions can be found in the technical appendix to their paper.
13This is called the ￿ outside￿wage in the literature.
14To see this, use the de￿nitions of amax and amin to that the derivatives of the wage bill w.r.t. the cut-o⁄s amin and amax are
zero.










where i 2 [0;1] indexes intermediate good types, and ￿f ￿ 1. Denote the ￿nal good price by Pt and the



























f > 0 is a ￿xed cost of production. As in CEE, the value of ￿
f will be chosen such that steady state
pro￿ts of intermediate good ￿rms are zero. There is no entry or exit in the intermediate good sector.
Nominal price stickiness is modelled as in CEE. In each period, a ￿rm i may reoptimize its nominal output
price Pi with a constant probability   (iid across ￿rms and time). In line with the identifying assumption of
the VAR, reoptimization takes place before the realization of the monetary policy shock. If the ￿rm cannot
reoptimize its price, the current price is indexed by lagged in￿ ation ￿t￿1 = Pt￿1=Pt￿2; i.e., Pit = ￿t￿1Pit￿1.
Firms which can reoptimize choose the price e Pt that maximizes expected discounted pro￿ts that accrue until















subject to the demand relationship (31). In (33), Pj = pjP is the nominal price of the input goods produced
by jobs.
The linearized version of the resulting aggregate ￿nal good price (32) is the Phillip￿ s curve






b ￿t+1 + (1 ￿ ￿ )
1 ￿  
  (1 + ￿)
b pjt. (34)
Current in￿ ation depends on lagged in￿ ation through indexing, and marginal costs and future in￿ ation
through reoptimization.
3.3 Households, Capital Utilization, and Investment Adjustment Costs
Households accumulate physical capital, rent capital services to ￿rms, search for jobs if unemployed, receive
pro￿ts, and receive labor income if employed. The representative household chooses consumption C, investment
15All reoptimizing ￿rms choose the same price (see Woodford (1996)).





￿U (Ct+￿ ￿ eCt+￿￿1)
subject to the budget constraint












the evolution of the stock physical capital K








and the relevant transversality conditions. Households￿consumption, capital utilization, and investment deci-
sions are made before the monetary policy shock is realized.
Capital services are related to the stock of physical capital by
Kt = e utKt.
In (35), T represents lump sum taxes,16 d are pro￿ts of intermediate good and job sector ￿rms, Rt ￿ 1 is the
nominal interest rate, and a(e ut) measures the resource cost associated with capital utilization. As in CEE,
steady state utilization is normalized to 1 and associated costs are normalized to a(1) = 0. To solve the




u > 0 needs to be parameterized. If ￿
u is high, increases in the
utilization rate induce a large increase in utilization costs, making adjustment on this margin more costly.
Variable capital utilization increases the supply elasticity of capital services with respect to changes in the
rental rate of capital and hence lowers the response of marginal costs in response to a monetary policy shock. For
a shorter sample, CEE show that available measures of capital utilization respond positively to an expansionary
monetary shock. Quantitatively, their model responses are consistent with the estimated ones. This is also the
case for the model estimates presented below.





measures investment adjustment costs, with ￿(1) =
￿0 (1) = 0 and ￿00 (1) = ￿
I > 0 is parameterized.
As noted above for vacancy adjustment costs, investment adjustment costs in the growth rate of investment
are a reduced-form representation of time-to-build frictions in investment across a range of projects with ran-
dom maturities and imperfect substitutability between investment types (Lucca (2005)). This formulation of
investment adjustment costs will be responsible for the model￿ s ability to match the hump shaped response of
investment to aggregate shocks observed in the data.17
Denote the multiplier on the evolution of physical capital (36) by ￿
K
t and the multiplier associated with the
budget constraint by ￿t:
The household￿ s consumption choice satis￿es
Et￿1 (￿t ￿ Uc;t) = 0, (37)
16Recall that the component of b that represents unemployment bene￿ts is ￿nanced via lump sum taxes.
17see also Basu and Kimball (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2003).




























t ￿ a0(e ut)
￿
= 0 (39)














where Rt is the (gross) nominal interest rate;￿R is a policy persistence parameter, and ￿￿ and ￿y gauge the
policy responses of the monetary authority to current in￿ ation and output respectively. Monetary policy shocks
are serially uncorrelated. The nominal interest rate falls in response to an expansionary monetary policy shock
"t < 0.
3.5 Resource Constraint









































t equals aggregate output of the job sector, net of the ￿xed costs incurred in the intermediate good sector.
Y ￿
t does not correspond to aggregate output in the data because it does not take into account relative price
di⁄erences between intermediate good types.
GDP in the data corresponds to ￿nal good output Yt, and can be divided between consumption, Ct, invest-
ment, It, capital utilization costs, a(e ut)Kt, and aggregate vacancy posting costs ￿t = vt￿vac
t . The resource
constraint is





















In the linearization around the steady state, c P ￿
t
Pt is zero such that
sc b Ct + sIb It + s￿b ￿t + sKa0 (e ut)b e ut + sK
b Kt = b Y ￿
t ;
22where sc = C
Y ￿￿￿, sI = I
Y ￿￿￿, and sK = K
Y ￿￿￿.
3.6 Approximate Model Solution
The model solution is approximated by linearizing the equilibrium conditions around the steady state and
solving the system with the method of undetermined coe¢ cients described in Christiano (2002).
4 Estimation
I follow the estimation strategy in CEE. A subset of parameters ￿ is calibrated (￿c) and the remaining pa-
rameters are estimated (￿e) by minimizing a measure of the distance between the empirical estimates of the
impulse response functions, b ￿, and corresponding model impulse responses ￿(￿e). The estimator of ￿e solves
b ￿e = argmin
￿
h




b ￿ ￿ ￿(￿)
i
;
subject to theoretical constraints on the parameters, where V is a diagonal matrix with the sample variances of
b ￿.
In e⁄ect, ￿e is chosen such that the model impulse responses lie as closely as possible within the con￿dence
bands of the empirical estimates. The ￿rst 20 quarters of the impulse responses were used in the construction
of b ￿ and ￿(￿e).
First, I discuss the benchmark values for ￿c. I will discuss the sensitivity of the results to alternative values
of some calibrated parameters and alternative partitions of the sets of calibrated and estimated parameters after
the presentation of the benchmark estimates.
For the labor market parameters, the set of calibrated parameters includes steady state values of employment
relative to the labor force n; the separation rate ￿; the fraction of exogenous in total separations (￿x=￿), the
vacancy ￿lling rate (q), and the elasticity of the matching function with respect to vacancies (￿).
The employment ratio and the quarterly separation rate are set to their respective sample means, n = 0:94
and ￿ = 0:1. These values of n and ￿ imply u = 1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)n = 0:1525, hir = 0:6125 and N = 0:8475. The
value of u is large in comparison with the o¢ cial unemployment rate. In the model, however, u is the pool
of searching workers and should encompass workers who are not included in the o¢ cial unemployment rate
but searching for work (e.g., discouraged workers). The value used here is consistent with those used in the
literature to account for the pool of searching workers. For a thorough discussion see Yashiv (2005).
The ratio of exogenous to total separations is set to ￿x=￿ = 0:68 (from data on the quit versus the layo⁄
rate) and the vacancy ￿lling probability q is set to 0:71 (see den Haan, Ramey, and Watson (2000)). These two
parameters are irrelevant for the dynamic implications of the model. They play a role for the response of job
￿ ows as de￿ned in the literature using job ￿ ows data.
In the benchmark, the elasticity of the matching function ￿ is set to the full sample point estimate obtained
from the relationship between the job ￿nding rate, vacancies, and unemployment, with ￿ = 0:3.18 The scale
parameter m of the matching function is pinned down by the equilibrium conditions evaluated in the non-
stochastic steady state.
Of the remaining labor market parameters, I estimate non-market opportunities b and workers￿average
opportunity costs of employment, e b = H (a)=￿ + b, which include disutility costs in the form of the preference
shocks, and the forgone values of unemployment bene￿ts and home production. As explained in Section 3.1.4,
18The estimate is from an IV regression using lagged values of vacancies and the unemployment rate.
23Parameter Description Value Source
n employment ratio 0:94 data
￿ separation rate 0:1 data
￿
x
￿ ￿ quits/all separations 0:68 den Haan et al. (2000)
q vacancy ￿lling rate 0:7 den Haan et al.(2000)
￿ discount factor 1:03￿:25 real interest rate
￿ depreciation rate 0:025 as in CEE
￿
f mark-up 1:2 consistent with CEE estimates
￿ capital share 0:36 as in CEE
￿ matching elasticity 0:3 estimate from aggregate data
  price stickiness 0:85 consistent with CEE estimates
￿R policy persistence 0:85 Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999)
￿y Taylor rule 0:5 Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999)
￿￿ Taylor rule 1:5 Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999)
Table 2: Calibrated Parameters
these parameters are crucial for the propagation mechanisms governing the responses of worker ￿ ows and
in￿ ation.
The value of the threshold a follows from the separation condition (14) evaluated in the non-stochastic
steady state. Also, I estimate the bargaining share ￿, the parameter governing wage rigidity, ￿
w, the elasticity
of the preference shock distribution with respect to the threshold a, "F;a, and the parameter ￿vac of the vacancy
adjustment cost function. Along with the other parameters, the bargaining share determines the steady state
revenue product of a match (￿) and steady state vacancy posting costs, ￿vac = {. The average steady state
wage w is normalized to 1. Hence, b;e b, and { are reported relative to the steady state average wage.
For instantaneous utility, I assume U (ct ￿ ect￿1) = log(ct ￿ect￿1). As in CEE, the discount factor is set to
￿ = 1:03￿:25, the depreciation rate to ￿ = 0:025, and the capital share to ￿ = 0:36. The parameter governing
the mark-up of intermediate goods ￿rms is set to ￿
f = 1:2 in the benchmark. This value is consistent with
estimates reported in CEE. As noted above, ￿xed costs of the intermediate goods sector, ￿
f; are set such that
steady state pro￿ts of that sector are zero. The parameters ￿
uand ￿
I governing utilization and investment
adjustment costs and the habit persistence parameter e are estimated.
In the benchmark estimation, the price rigidity parameter   is set to 0:85. This value is also used by Trigari
(2004) and is consistent with estimates in CEE for the corresponding version of their model without a working
capital channel (see below). The parameters of the Taylor rule are set to ￿y = 0:5, and ￿￿ = 1:5, policy
persistence ￿R = 0:85. These values are consistent with estimates reported in Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999).
Table 2 summarizes the values of the parameters ￿c that are ￿xed in the benchmark.
5 Results and Discussion
5.1 Benchmark
Table 3 presents the parameter estimates. The corresponding model impulse responses are displayed as dashed
lines in Figure (4) above. Overall, the model is able to replicate the empirical IRFs reasonably well. Consider
the model response of the job ￿nding rate, vacancies, the separation rate, and output. All of these responses lie
within the 95% con￿dence bands but tend to show less persistence than their empirical counterparts. In￿ ation
shows little response, due to (i) nominal price rigidity, (ii) a strong response of employment for a given increase
of the price of job-output, (iii) an increase in capital utilization, and (iv) wage rigidity.
24Parameter Description benchmark (1)
￿
w wage rigidity 0:49
(:049)
￿ worker share 0:77
(:032)
b unemp. ben./home prod 0:96
(:011)
"Fa elasticity of F 0:17
(:071)
e b ￿ match costs￿ 0:97
(:002)
￿vac convexity of vac. costs 2:63
(:22)
e habit persistence 0:82
(:0027)
￿





Table 3: Benchmark Parameter Estimates (Standard Errors in Parentheses)
Note that the model￿ s IRF for in￿ ation cannot account for the price puzzle in the ￿rst quarters after the
shock. In CEE, ￿rms must ￿nance the wage bill at nominal interest rate R: In response to an expansionary
monetary shock, R falls and marginal costs may fall initially, due to the drop in the e⁄ective wage bill Rw in
the case of ￿ sticky￿wages. I chose not to include the working capital channel because it would introduce an
additional propagation mechanism on the labor market side of the model and complicate comparisons to the
existing literature. Most importantly, this channel is directly related only to monetary shocks.
First, consider the parameters that are common to this model and CEE. The estimate of the habit persistence
parameter and the investment adjustment cost parameters are 0:82 and 3:46 respectively. These values are high
compared to estimates in CEE (e = 0:65 and ￿
I = 2:48), but comparable to others in the literature. For
example, Del Negro, Schorfheide, Smets, and Wouters (2004) obtain e = 0:725 and ￿
I = 3:24; DiCecio (2005)
estimates e = 0:76 and ￿
I = 3:54: The estimate of the capital utilization parameter ￿
u is also higher than in
CEE, where ￿
u is set to a value close to zero. The response of capital utilization (not shown) is consistent with
the estimated responses in CEE. In CEE, the Calvo parameter and the mark-up of intermediate good ￿rms
is estimated. In the benchmark, these parameters are set to values consistent with the CEE estimates for the
variant of their model that shuts down the working capital channel.
The estimated degree of wage rigidity is ￿
w = 0:49: To interpret this parameter, note that it implies that
in steady state, wages are approximately changed every 2 quarters. The implied duration of wage contracts is
short, especially in comparison to the duration of price contracts (6:5 quarters). Recall however, that a strong
restriction is imposed on wage rigidity: Wages are changed if they deviate too far from a social norm average
level and whenever a ￿xed wage would violate participation constraints and hence induce privately ine¢ cient
separations. The latter is not true for the Calvo-style pricing in the intermediate goods sector, a feature that
has often been criticized in the literature, especially in conjunction with Calvo-style wage rigidity. Furthermore,
relatively frequent wage changes do not imply that the resulting wage changes are large. The magnitude of the
response of the wage is governed by the parameter b (and e b).
The estimates of e b and b imply that the average wage is very close to workers￿opportunity costs of em-
ployment, and almost all of these opportunity costs are non-utility costs, such as foregone income and home
production, (b). Furthermore, the estimated value of the worker bargaining share is high. This parameter
governs the steady state relationship of the wage to ￿rm pro￿ts. A high value of b in conjunction with a high
worker share implies that steady state ￿rm pro￿ts are small. In particular, the estimates imply ￿rm pro￿ts
relative to the wage bill of ￿￿w
w = 0:13%. Hence, the value of b relative to the match revenue net of capital
25costs, b=￿ = 0:96 is also high.
The ratio b=￿ has been the focus of the recent literature on the evaluation of the MP model. Hagedorn and
Manovskii (2005) report a value ofe b=￿ = 0:94 in conjunction with a bargaining share of ￿ = 0:06; consistent with
(i) wage determination via Nash-Bargaining in a model without endogenous worker separations and without
capital, (ii) the response of wages to productivity shocks (using Solon, Barsky, and Parker (1994)￿ s data), and
(iii) pro￿t data from Basu and Fernald (1997).
The benchmark estimate of b=￿ reported here is consistent with their result. Note however that wage
determination deviates from Nash-Bargaining in the model discussed here. The value of the worker share is
much higher than the one reported in Hagedorn and Manovskii (2005). Stated di⁄erently, I ￿nd that pro￿ts
must be low. Recall that ￿in the job sector ￿pro￿ts compensate ￿rms for recruiting costs. Hence, if steady
state pro￿ts are low, recruiting costs must be low. The estimates imply that recruiting costs are ￿
vac
q = 1%
of the (quarterly) wage bill. Low recruiting costs in turn imply that the e⁄ect of search frictions on marginal
costs and hence in￿ ation is small (see the discussion in Section 3.1.4). This value of recruiting costs may be
too low, and is lower than most values used calibration exercises. Reliable data on these costs are not available
(Hamermesh (1993)).
Recall that b not only encompasses unemployment bene￿ts, whose value is about 40% of wages (the re-
placement ratio), but also elusive costs such as home production. If, however, b consists mostly of alternative
income sources such as unemployment bene￿ts, its high value relative to the wage is inconsistent with evidence
on income losses of displaced workers (Davis (2005)).
Because of these uncertainties, I conduct a sensitivity analysis in Section 5.3. I re-estimate the model for
the cases of (i) a ￿xed value of e b = 0:85, and (ii) a ￿xed value of recruiting costs ￿
vac
q = 10%. Furthermore,
the previous analysis has ignored the potential role of overhead and turnover costs as propagation mechanisms
and determinants of the response of marginal costs. I integrate these in Section 6. Overhead costs are an
additional source of ampli￿cation. If overhead costs are quantitatively important, the model and empirical
impulse responses may be consistent with a lower value of b.
The following section analyzes the contribution of b and wage rigidity to the responses of the job ￿nding
rate, vacancies, and the inertial response of in￿ ation.
5.2 The Role of Wage Rigidity and the Opportunity Costs of Employment
Hagedorn and Manovskii (2005)￿ s results may lead one to conclude that a high value of opportunity costs (b)
and wage rigidity (￿
w) do not have di⁄erent implications. This is not the case in the model developed here, and
is due to the inclusion of the worker separation margin.
Figure 6 shows model impulse response functions for perturbations of e b and the degree of wage rigidity from
the estimated values to gauge their respective contributions. In the following experiments, the ratio b=e b is held
constant. The starting point are the dotted IRFs. These were constructed by setting ￿
w to 0 (Nash-Bargaining)
ande b to a lower than estimated value (0:85). In￿ ation reacts strongly, whereas the job ￿nding rate and vacancies
do not react enough.
Now increase the degree of wage rigidity to its estimated value (￿-marked IRFs). Vacancies and the job
￿nding rate react much more strongly. Note however, that ￿for this moderate degree of wage rigidity ￿wages
and in￿ ation still react too much. The strong rise in labor market tightness increases marginal costs, through
an increase of recruiting costs (￿vac
t =qt) and the wage, through a strong response of the outside option of the
worker.19









































Figure 6: Propagation Mechanisms in the Labor Market. ￿ : low e b and real wage rigidity; ￿ : low e b and
Nash Bargaining.
The left panel of Figure 7 shows the percentage deviations from steady state of the joint surplus value of the
match, (St), the ￿rm value (Jt), and the worker surplus value (￿t) for the estimated degree of wage rigidity.
Under Nash-Bargaining, the percentage deviations of these values would be identical. Wage rigidity increases
the response of the ￿rm value and decreases the response of the worker value. To clarify this, suppose that
there were no idiosyncratic shocks and assume that the wage is completely ￿xed. The current ￿ ow pro￿ts of
the ￿rm are ￿t ￿ ws. The current ￿ ow surplus value of the worker is ws ￿ b ￿ hirt (1 ￿ ￿x)Et￿t+1￿t+1, i.e.,
wage payments net of unemployment bene￿ts and net of the value of outside job opportunities available through
search. Now suppose a shock increases ￿t. The ￿rm value Jt rises. Because of free entry, vacancies and the
hiring rate increase. For a given value ￿t+1, the current worker value decreases if wages are ￿xed. For the
estimated degree of wage rigidity, ￿t does not decrease. This possibility is important in order to understand
why a higher degree of wage rigidity cannot be a substitute for a high value of b; allowing pro￿ts, recruiting
costs, and income losses upon worker displacement to be larger.
Figure 8 plots the case of high wage rigidity (￿
w = 0:9), keeping e b ￿xed at 0:85. The responses of the job
￿nding rate and vacancies exhibit strong ampli￿cation, but separations increase after about 4 quarters. The
reason is the high outside option of workers, stemming from the high job ￿nding rate. As shown in the second
panel of Figure 7, the worker value ￿t falls, leading to a drop in the joint continuation surplus value (last panel
of the ￿gure). Because the joint continuation value drops, separations increase. The strong increase in vacancy
creation creates a negative externality on existing jobs, by tightening the participation constraints.20
20This would also be the case under alternative formulations of wage determination that yield ￿ sticky￿ wages (e.g. Hall and
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Figure 7: Surplus Values
Furthermore, in￿ ation reacts more strongly, driven by a higher steady state value of recruiting costs and a
strong response of recruiting costs.
Although the job ￿nding rate reacts more strongly under high wage rigidity, the response of aggregate hours
(not shown) is not ampli￿ed considerably. In particular, the number of workers relative to the work force,
hirtut=Nt, may not increase after the shock because the unemployment pool diminishes quickly and because
separations drop by a smaller amount. A strong reaction of the job ￿nding rate does not necessarily imply a
strong reaction of the number of hires. This is consistent with the Bleakley, Ferris, and Fuhrer (1999) data on
hiring from unemployment and non-participation (Braun, De Bock, and DiCecio (2005)), but is incompatible
with the view that the hiring margin drives employment growth. Figure 9 plots the responses of (approximated)
unemployment and the contributions of the job ￿nding and separation rates for the VAR representation, the
benchmark model estimates, and the high wage rigidity regime.21
Is wage rigidity irrelevant in the sense of being substitutable to a high value of the opportunity costs of
employment? Figure 10 displays the IRFs (dotted lines) of the model when ￿
w = 0 (Nash-Bargaining) and the
other parameters, including e b; are set to the benchmark estimates. Note that the job ￿nding rate and vacancies
react much less to shocks. Hence, wage rigidity plays a distinct role in the propagation of the monetary policy
shock.
In Figure 10, the response of vacancies is small partly because of the convex vacancy adjustment costs needed
to reconcile the model with the persistent, hump-shaped response of vacancies. Because an initial increase in
vacancies is costly, ampli￿cation must be very strong. This is in line with Fujita and Ramey (2005), whose








































Figure 8: High Wage Rigidity (dotted line: ￿
w = :9, e b = :85)
5.3 Sensitivity Analysis
5.3.1 Fixed Recruiting Costs
Recruiting costs are a determinant of the response of marginal costs. In the estimated benchmark, these amount
to only 1% of the wage bill. Here, I ￿x the steady state value of ￿vac=q to 10% of the wage bill and re-estimate
the model. This value is used in the literature. The value of e b is pinned down by steady state conditions. The
parameters in ￿c are set as in the benchmark.
Column (1) of Table 4 reports the values of the estimated parameters. The value of b is bounded by e b. In
the estimation, I set b = e b, as b approached e b. The estimated degree of wage rigidity is now much higher than in
the benchmark. The implied value of e b is.0:945 Pro￿ts are 0:6% of the wage bill. The only remaining parameter
that changes considerably from its benchmark estimate is the worker share ￿, from 0:77 to 0:61: Figure 11 shows
the model￿ s impulse response functions. As expected, the response of in￿ ation is slightly more pronounced.
5.3.2 Fixed Opportunity Costs
Instead of ￿xing recruiting costs, suppose e b is ￿xed at 0:85, a value closer to ones used in the endogenous
destruction literature (e.g., den Haan, Ramey, and Watson (2000) and De Bock (2005)).
Column (2) of Table 4 reports the estimates. In the estimation procedure, the degree of wage rigidity
increased to its upper bound 1: I ￿xed its value to 0:95. For the same reason, b was set to e b.
Milgrom (2005)), because the e⁄ect works through the participation constraints and continuation values of ￿rm and worker.
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Figure 9: Unemployment and the contribution of job ￿nding and separations
Wage rigidity now plays a crucial role. Note also that the point estimate of the elasticity of the shock
distribution is large and imprecise.
5.3.3 Matching Elasticity
There are considerable di⁄erences in the calibrated and estimated values of the matching elasticity in the
literature. The value used in the benchmark was estimated from aggregate data on vacancies, the o¢ cial
unemployment rate, and the job ￿nding rate of unemployed workers. One of the reasons why this may be
problematic is that the o¢ cial unemployment pool does not include individuals from out of the labor force who
search for work. Furthermore, job-to-job transitions are not taken into account in the construction of the pool
of searching workers. The value ￿ = 0:3 is low relative to the plausible range of 0:3 to 0:5 reported in Petrongolo
and Pissarides (2001)￿ s survey of the matching function literature.
In column (3) of Table 4, the elasticity ￿ is estimated along with the other parameters. The estimate of the
elasticity is slightly lower (0:27) and the estimates of the other parameters do not change signi￿cantly. This is
consistent with Braun, De Bock, and DiCecio (2005), who ￿nd that shock speci￿c estimates of the matching
elasticity for a broad set of shocks do not di⁄er signi￿cantly from one another.
Another data source to estimate the matching elasticity is the three-pool BLS data from Bleakley, Ferris,
and Fuhrer (1999). Since this data, encompasses in￿ ows into employment from out-of-the labor force, one can
regress the number of hires on the (o¢ cial) unemployment rate and vacancies, yielding ￿ = 0:45: In column
(4), ￿ is set to this value: The estimated degree of wage rigidity and the bargaining share are lower, and the
elasticity of the separation margin is higher. The estimates are sensitive to the value of ￿ because it governs
the joint responses of vacancies, the job ￿nding rate, and unemployment.
5.3.4 Size of the Pool of Searching Workers
The average separation rate from the three-pool data is ￿ = 0:13: In Column (5), we set the separation rate to
this value while keeping n constant. The implied pool of searching workers and the job ￿nding probability are
u = 0:18 and hir = 0:67 respectively. Hence, the pool of searching workers is larger.
The estimated values of the degree of wage rigidity ￿
w and e b decrease. When the pool of searching workers




































Figure 10: Nash Bargaining: Dotted lines are model IRFs with ￿
w = 0 (Nash Bargaining). The other
parameters set to the benchmark point estimates.
slumps as it becomes harder for ￿rms to ￿nd workers. But if the separation rate is high, the decrease of the
unemployment pool is less pronounced. Hence, the estimates of the parameters governing the propagation are
somewhat lower.
5.3.5 Nominal Price Stickiness
In Column (6), the Calvo parameter governing nominal price rigidity is set to a lower value of   = 0:75: The
estimated degree of wage rigidity and e b are now higher. The value of b is bounded by e b. In the estimation, I set
b = e b, as b approached e b.22
6 Overhead Costs and Comprehensive Hiring Costs
Non-responsive costs accruing to the ￿rm are a further potential propagation mechanism that has so far been
omitted from the analysis. These could be ￿xed ￿ ow costs ! or sunk up-front training costs ￿hir incurred by the
￿rm when the match is initiated, or ￿ring taxes when the match is terminated. The former enter the surplus
22Attempts to estimate   and the markup ￿f failed. During the estimation,   decreased together with an increase in wage
rigidity and e b. For these parameter values the solution of the model is indeterminate. See Krause and Lubik (2004a) for an analysis
of indeterminacy and instability in the search model.
31Parameter Description ￿
vac
q = :1 (1) e b = :85 (2) ￿ (3) high ￿ (4) high ￿ (5)   (6)
￿






































































































































Table 4: Parameter Estimates (Standard Errors in Parentheses)
value of matches analogously to e b, but on the ￿rm side, with
Jt = maxk;a
Z at
￿t ￿ ! ￿ wt + (1 ￿ ￿x)Et￿t+1Jt+1dF (a).













where Jt+1 is de￿ned as above and we have allowed ￿hir
t to depend on t to signify that ￿like ￿vac
t ￿￿hir
t may
include convex adjustment costs. Expected ￿ring taxes enter in a similar way (see Pissarides (2000)).





t , consisting of the expected costs




qt ; and training costs, ￿hir
t . If training costs do not
react much to shocks, a smaller fraction of comprehensive hiring costs increases with the fall in the vacancy
￿lling rate q in response to expansionary shocks. Hence, given ￿ uctuations in J translate into larger ￿ uctuations
in qt; labor market tightness, and the job ￿nding rate.
A formulation such as the one derived here can be a basis for the comprehensive hiring cost speci￿cation
postulated in Yashiv (2005), although in his speci￿cation, hiring costs are represented as a disruption of the
production process and proportional to output.
In a preliminary analysis of an extended version of the benchmark model which includes ￿xed values of either
! or ￿hir, I found estimates of the degree of wage rigidity to be higher whereas the estimate of e b was lower.
Although, ! and ￿hir increase the response of vacancies and the job ￿nding rate, the response of wages also
increases. Hence, the estimated degree of wage rigidity increases.
Convexities in ￿hir






, i.e., convexity in the number of






were not able to generate
23Formally, they are not subject to an initial wage bargain between the ￿rm and worker. In the terminology of the literature,
the ￿ outside wage￿of newly formed matches is equal to the ￿ inside wage￿of continuing matches. If these costs were shared between



































































persistent, hump-shaped response of vacancies. This did not depend on whether the adjustment costs were
internal or external to the ￿rm.
Regarding the criticism of a high value of workers￿opportunity costs of employment and low recruiting costs
and pro￿ts mentioned in Section 5.1 ,an implication of the inclusion of overhead and turnover costs is that the
surplus value of working ￿; comprehensive hiring costs, and ￿rm pro￿ts can be higher for a similar ampli￿cation
of aggregate shocks. I am continuing to explore this propagation mechanism. Clearly, evidence on these costs
is needed to disentangle them from workers￿opportunity costs of employment.
7 Intensive Margin
In the benchmark model, all employment adjustment was on the extensive margin, i.e., in the number of workers.
In this Section, an hours choice is introduced along the lines of Trigari (2004) to study the e⁄ects of wage rigidity
on this margin.

































































Figure 12: Empirical and Model IRFs: Intensive Margin of Hours
preference shock.24 The ￿rm takes into account the e⁄ect of the hours choice on subsequent wage negotiations
and the separation threshold. Under Nash-Bargaining, the hours choice would be jointly e¢ cient, in analogy to
capital choice. Under wage rigidity, this is only true in steady state, when ws = w.
Job output now depends not only on capital per worker but also on hours h per worker, with
Ath1￿￿k￿
Firm and worker values are
Jt = maxk;h;a
Z a




a + g (h)
￿t
￿ wtdF (a)
24Otherwise, the ￿rm could force the worker to her participation constraint.
34where g (h) is the disutility of work. Assume g (h) = ￿h
1+￿hh1+￿h. The separation condition becomes
￿t + (1 ￿ ￿x)Et￿tJt+1 ￿
g (h) + at
￿t
￿ wt = 0;
































+ ￿min (￿t + (1 ￿ ￿x)Et￿tJt+1)dF (a):
Assume that the ￿rm chooses hours prior to the realization of a, and takes the e⁄ect on subsequent wage






















Assume that the monetary policy shock induces small changes in the fraction of wages that deviate from




b ￿t ￿ b ht
￿
= ￿





In e⁄ect, (45) assumes that the elasticities of the distribution at the steady state values of amin and amax
are small. As noted before, a full speci￿cation of the distribution would allow us to include the e⁄ects work-
ing through the shares of changing wages, at the cost, however, of representing the degree of rigidity in a
parsimonious way and isolating the rigidity from the level e⁄ect of wages.























Table 5: Parameter Estimates: Intensive Margin (Standard Errors in Parentheses)
25To see this, use the de￿nitions of amax and amin to show that the derivatives of the wage bill w.r.t. the cut-o⁄s amin and
amax are zero.
35In the VAR, total hours are now disaggregated into employment and hours per worker. The employment
series is from the BLS, hours per worker are average hours from the CES. The latter￿ s availability limits the
sample to 1964:Q3-2003:Q4. The remaining variables are unchanged. Figure 12 presents the estimated impulse
response functions. Note that the responses of the variables are similar to the ones reported above. For the
estimation, the parameter ￿h is set to 10 as in Trigari (2004) and is consistent with microeconomic evidence.
All other parameters a set as in the benchmark.
Table 5 presents parameter estimates. The estimated degree of wage rigidity is now 0:78, much higher than
in the benchmark, whereas the value of e b is roughly unchanged.
8 Conclusion
I formulate and estimate a New-Keynesian DSGE model with search frictions in the labor market to understand
(i) the propagation mechanisms generating strong and persistent responses of vacancies and the job ￿nding rate
of unemployed workers, (ii) the weaker but distinct response of worker separations, and (iii) the interaction
of search frictions, wage rigidity, and in￿ ation in response to monetary policy shocks. The model developed
here can be used as a framework for designing optimal monetary policy and gauging the interaction between
monetary and labor market policies. The analysis can be extended to study the interaction of other aggregate
shocks with search frictions, wage rigidity, unemployment, and, for example, labor market and ￿scal policies.
Both wage rigidity and a high value of workers￿opportunity costs of employment are key features of the model
that generate the strong responses of vacancy creation and the job ￿nding rate observed in the data. A high
value of opportunity costs of a ￿rm-worker match in conjunction with moderate recruiting costs is responsible
for the inertial response of in￿ ation, allowing output to expand without a large increase in marginal costs.
Adjustment costs in vacancies generate the persistent, hump-shaped responses of vacancies and the job ￿nding
rate. The latter could be explained together with investment adjustment costs in a time-to-build framework, a
line of research followed by Braun, De Bock, and Lucca (2005).
Wage rigidity generates su¢ cient ampli￿cation of vacancies and the job ￿nding rate even when workers￿un-
responsive opportunity costs are relatively small. However, wage rigidity is not a substitute for high opportunity
costs of employment. If wage rigidity is high, vacancies and the job ￿nding rate show a strong response. But
the joint continuation value of the match may eventually fall after an expansionary shock, due to a tightening
of workers￿participation constraint. The decline in the continuation value may in turn induce an increase in
separations that is incompatible with the data. This e⁄ect is large if opportunity costs of employment are low,
because the separation margin is then mostly determined by movements in continuation values and outside job
opportunities of the worker. This ￿nding points to the importance of integrating on-the-job search. A rise in the
value of outside job opportunities in response to expansionary shocks is compatible with pro-cyclical job-to-job
transitions which are arguably observed in the data (Nagypal (2004)). Ignoring the cyclical properties of worker
separations in explanations of unemployment and employment dynamics is not only at odds with the available
data, but may also lead to erroneous conclusions about the importance of the economic mechanisms at work.
The form of wage rigidity developed here should be interpreted as a simpli￿cation that allows a general
equilibrium analysis with endogenously determined worker separations into unemployment. Future research
should base this reduced form on economic foundations of rigid wages, such as Menzio (2004). Also, further
research is needed to understand the qualitative and quantitative aspects of the ￿ ￿xed￿cost components of the
match. These include home production, unemployment bene￿ts, turnover costs such as training and ￿ring costs,
and overhead and set-up costs.
The requirement of jointly e¢ cient separations imposed in this paper and the lack of persistence in the
idiosyncratic shocks may drive some of the results pertaining to the role of wage rigidity and worker separations.
36Nevertheless, the central question of whether or not we have a good understanding of the determinants of
worker ￿ ows seems to be tied to the separation margin, more broadly consisting of worker separations into
unemployment, job-to-job transitions, and job destruction. For such an analysis, persistent heterogeneity in
￿rms￿productivity and on-the-job search should be introduced.
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41Variable Units Haver (USECON)
Civilian Noninstitutional Population (16+) Thousands LN16N
Real GDP Bil. Chn. 2000 $, SAAR GDPH
GDP: Chain Price Index Index, 2000=100, SA JGDP
Federal Funds (e⁄ective) Rate % p.a. FFED
Hours of all persons (Nonfarm Bus. Sector) Index, 1992=100, SA LXFNH
Index of Help-Wanted Advertising in Newspapers Index, 1987=100, SA LHELP
Average Weekly Hours (Private Industries) hours, SA
Civilian Employment (16 +) Thousands,SA
Unemployment (16 +) Thousands,SA
Table 6: Raw data
A Data
Table 6 describes the raw data used in the paper and provides the corresponding Haver mnemonics. The data
are readily available from other commercial (e.g., DRI-WEFA) and non-commercial (e.g., the St. Louis FRB
database FREDII) databases, as well as from the original sources (BEA, BLS, Board of Governors of the FRS).
The vacancy series used in the VAR analysis is v = LHELP
LF .
B Linearization of the Wage Equation
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where we used the separation condition ￿t ￿ at
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for the coe¢ cient of b ￿t.
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Note that wnash = w under wage rigidity. Substitute the expression for b w
nash
t into the expression for b wt and use
wnash = w = ws :
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